Managing externalities of groundwater use through electricity reforms Evidence from three Indian states of West Bengal, Gujarat

and Uttarakhand



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Groundwater irrigation in India

Rapid increase in area under groundwater irrigation due to

- High population density & small land holdings
- Demand for assured supply of irrigation
- Subsidized electricity

This led to

- Increase in electric pumps in 1980s and 1990s
- Increasing contribution of GW to agriculture
- Benefited millions of poor farmers

But multiple benefits came at a cost

Unsustainable use of groundwater in some pockets and under use in others

 Quality deterioration either due to over use or natural causes (arsenic and fluoride)

Twin concerns of

Groundwater resource sustainability

Livelihoods and Equity

Direct management of GW is not an option in South Asia

Huge number of small users (25 millions wells and tubewells

No clear demarcation of property rights

Exigencies of securing a livelihood

Politically sensitive

Indirect GW management through electricity pricing and subsidy Pumping behavior of tubewell owners is influenced by: Type of electricity tariff (flat rate vs. metered rate) Hours of electricity supply

Examples from three Indian states: West Bengal, Gujarat and Uttarakhand

Location of the study states



GW and electricity in 3 states

	Gujarat	West Bengal	Uttarakhand
Rainfall	700-1000 mm	1500-2000 mm	1200 mm
GW potential	16 BCM	31 BCM	2 BCM
GW depth	>100 feet	Less than 15 feet	30-50 feet
Electricity tariff	USD 16/HP/year	USD 50/HP/year	USD 25/HP/year
Agri. electricity consumption	> 40%	6%	12%
Elec. Subsidy	> 50-70%	Less than 5%	Medium 25%
Main irrigated crops	Cotton, high value	Summer paddy	Wheat
Hours of pumping	500-1500	1500-2100	500-800
GW markets	Highly developed	Highly developed	Thin

Gujarat: Jyotirgram experiment

- Gujarat: water scarce & intensive GW use
- Flat tariff promoted GW use
- GW markets flourished
- However, these tariffs remained low
- Leading to losses of electricity sector
- Over-exploitation of GW resources

Gujarat....

- In 2003, Gujarat launched Jyotirgram Yojana
- Separated agricultural feeders from rural domestic and commercial feeders
- Provided 24 hours of high quality electricity to domestic and commercial sector
- But rationed electricity to agricultural sector to only 8 hours

Electricity Network Before JGY

Electricity Network after JGY





Outcomes of Gujarat experiment

- Over all quality of life improved due to 24 hours electricity
- Subsidy given by electricity utility for agriculture declined remarkably
- Some reported that GW levels recovered in some pockets
- However, small and marginal farmers suffered as they no longer got access to GW

Electricity reforms and metering in West Bengal

Universal metering of tubewells

 Introduction of Time of the Day (TOD) meters

Tamper proof meter with automatic meter reading instrument
 GSM and GIS technology for monitoring

Hi-Tech Metering Technology

Data Center



Winners and Losers Pump owners: Largely winners

Same hour of pumping - Less electricity bill Same hour of selling water – Higher revenue [©]Higher bargaining power vis-à-vis water buyers **Win – win situation**

Water buyers: Losers



Increase in water charges by 30-50%
Adverse terms & condition of buying water

Groundwater use efficiency: Winner





Increased adoption of plastic pipes for conveyance

Oracle Better maintenance of field channels

Construction of underground pipelines

[©]But will it save water?

Electricity and metering in Uttarakhand

- Universal metering of all tubewells since 2006
- Electronic meters, but needs to be read manually
- During our fieldwork in 2008, less than 50% of the tubewells had been metered
- There is paucity of manpower in state electricity boards, no new recruitments in the offing
- Therefore, metering here would bring about the same old set of problems for which it was discarded in the first place

Uttarakhand...

- However, the meter tariffs are low here and tubewell owners would have benefitted
- There would have been no impact on groundwater markets because the markets are rather thin anyway
- Might have been a win-win option, if only it were implemented right.....

Conclusions

- Examples from Gujarat and West Bengal show that
 - Electricity policies lead to change in pumping behavior
 - Limiting hours of pumping leads to lower GW pumping as in Gujarat
 - Charging electricity on pro-rata rate leads to lower incentives for pumping as in WB
- However, in both scenarios, small and marginal farmers loose access to GW

Then the key challenge is to...

Manage externalities of GW use using economic incentives without significantly harming livelihood options of the poor people

Based on..

Mukherji et al. (2009), Metering of agricultural power supply in West Bengal: Who loses and who gains, accepted by Energy Policy. Shah, T. & S. Verma (2008), Co-management of electricity and groundwater: An assessment of Gujarat's Jyotirgram Scheme, Economic and Political Weekly, 43(7):59-66

Umar A. et al. (2008), Metering of agricultural tubewells in Uttarakhand, unpublished report submitted to IWMI.



Rapid increase in groundwater irrigation



Rising contribution of groundwater





